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Services standardization in the United-States and in Europe: 
an institutional analysis of private authority. 
 
This contribution explores the role of international standards in the rules governing the 
internationalisation of the service economy. It analyses on a cross-institutional basis patterns 
of authority in the institutional setting of service standards in the European and Amercian 
context. The entry into force of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 gave 
international standards a major role in harmonising the technical specifications of goods and 
services traded on the global market Despite the careful wording of the WTO, a whole range 
of international bodies still have the capacity to define generic as well as detailed technical 
specifications affecting how swelling offshore services are expected to be traded on 
worldwide basis. The analysis relies on global political economy approaches to identify 
constitutive patterns of authority mediating between the political and the economic spheres on 
a transnational space. It extends to the area of service standards the assumption that the 
process of globalisation is not opposing states and markets, but a joint expression of both of 
them including new patterns and agents of structural change through formal and informal 
power and regulatory practices. The paper argues that service standards reflect the 
significant development of a form of transnational hybrid authority, that blurs the distinction 
between private and public actors, whose scope spread all along from physical measures to 
societal values, and which reinforces the deterritorialisation of regulatory practices in 
contemporary capitalism. It provides evidence of this argument by analysing the current 
European strategy regarding service standardization in response to several programming 
mandate of the European Commission and the American views on the future development of 
service standards. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores the political implications of the growing influence of international 
standards in the service sector. It analyses on a cross-institutional basis patterns of authority 
setting standards in the European and American context. The entry into force of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 gave international standards a major role in harmonising 
the technical specifications of goods and services traded on the global market. The few 
studies specifically focused on the role of international standards in the service sector share 
the assumption that, although almost non existent until very recently, they are expected to 
surge in parallel to the importance of services in the economy and society at large, greater 
reliance on standards in a context of regulatory reform and a more intense internationalisation 
of the sector (Blind, 2003; ISO Focus, 2006). This view strongly echoes positions upheld by 
high-ranking officials of standardisation bodies. When asked what fields of standardisation 
will be most active in the coming years, Alan Bryden, Secretary General of the International 
Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), is straightforward in considering that ‘one of our 
biggest challenge is precisely how to address the service sector’ (personal interview with the 
authors, Geneva, 8 June 2007). While standards supposedly seek greater rationality and 
coherence in distinct industries and services, all of them involve ongoing struggles in complex 
configurations of power involving such actors as multinational enterprises, organised 
interests, and state regulators. The study of the European and Amercian institutional 
framework for setting international standards come into play in this context. 
Studies on standardization never fail to stress the fundamental differences between the 
European and the American institutional framework for setting standards. Institutional 
analyses shed light on these two systems as a case of “regulatory competition” where 
domestic institutional complementarities play a key role (Czaya and Hesser, 2001; Mattli and 
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Büthe, 2003; Tate, 2001; Werle, 2001; Winn, 2009). From this view, the tension between the 
European and American systems reflects a dichotomy between coordinated market economies 
and liberal market economies. While the former favours a coordinated standardization system 
with greater reliance on territorially-based legitimacy and state oversight, the latter supports 
competing sources of standards and relies on market mechanism to ensure the definition and 
adoption of standards. In other words, the institutional underpinning of international 
standardization would depend on the national frameworks and show strong national-
international and market-state dichotomies. While institutional analyses shed light on 
significant framework conditions differentiating the European and American setting, they 
often entail implicit or explicit normative claims about what is a good standardization system. 
They also tend to reify the differences between the European and the American model and to 
restrict the internal conflicts to the US system. As Egyedi emphasized, conventional 
approaches tend to underestimate the opening of most industry consortia and overestimate the 
practical implications of democratic procedures within formal organizations (Egyedi, 2005). 
A more historical perspective underlines the complementarities between regulation and free 
trade and the role of standardization in the construction of the US and EU internal market 
(Egan, 2001). Such analyses prompt us to analyze more specifically the connection between 
the freedom of private actors to set technical specifications within a market economy and the 
political environment of the institutional framework required to ensure some order to these 
practices on a transnational basis (Cutler, et al., 1999; Graz and Nölke, 2008; Krause Hansen, 
2008). 
By relying on global political economy approaches which try to uncover the power relations 
underpinning such connection, the paper extends to the area of service standards the 
assumption that the process of globalisation is not opposing states and markets, but a joint 
expression of both of them including new patterns and agents of structural change through 
formal and informal power and regulatory practices. Understanding how institutional setting 
affects the development of service standards calls for bringing more systematically together 
three distinct categories: the actors defining the standards, the objects concerned, and the 
space of their deployment. The paper argues that service standards reflect the significant 
development of a form of transnational hybrid authority, that blurs the distinction between 
private and public actors, whose scope spread all along from physical measures to societal 
values, and which reinforces the deterritorialisation of regulatory practices in contemporary 
capitalism. It provides evidence of this argument by analysing the current European strategy 
regarding service standardization in response to several programming mandate of the 
European Commission and the American views on the future development of service 
standards.  
The data presented in this paper are drawn from interviews with top officials in charge of 
standardisations and regulatory policies1, printed and Internet-published material published by 
the institutions to which the interviewees belong and as well as by the specialised press. 
The first section of the paper emphasises the relevance of the case of service standards. The 
second section reviews the literature on the institutional differences between the U.S. and 
European setting regarding standardization. The third section presents our theoretical 
framework. Sections 4, 5 and 6 present and discuss our findings on the CEN service project 
and American understanding regarding service standardisation. We conclude on the 
limitations and future research questions raised by the analysis. 
                                                
1 Including the American National Standard Institute (ANSI) ; Amercian Society of Mechanical Engineers 
(ASME), American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM international), National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), Consumer Electronics Association (CEA), Consumer Specialty Products Association 
(CPSA). 
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SERVICE, GLOBALISATION AND STANDARDISATION - BACKGROUD 
The growing significance of the service economy has become a prominent feature in the 
current structural change towards a knowledge-based global economy. Services now account 
for more than 70% of GDP and employment in the advanced economies of the OECD and for 
more than 50% in developing as well as central and eastern European countries. The 
significance of services not only pertains to their growing share in the economy and their 
close connection to technology and knowledge. It is also related to their swift 
internationalisation and to an important regulatory reform. Many services, which are now 
supplied on a commercial basis, used to be predominantly provided by the state as public 
utilities and social services. Prominent examples are transport or telecommunications but also 
health services and education. Even though privatised, some of these services have remained 
highly regulated by state bureaucracies, and in the same time depend on corporate standards 
emanating from management decisions and industrial specialisation, or from domestic 
standard-setting bodies. The internationalisation of services challenges these national 
regulatory arrangements. International voluntary standards come into play in this context. 
The entry into force of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) Agreement and the revision of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) 
Agreement in 1995 and the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) established a 
formal devolution of power to international standards-setting organisations. Unlike the loose 
provisions regarding technical regulation of the old GATT, the TBT and SPS Agreements, 
like some provisions of the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) and the 
plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA article VI :2b) give international 
standards a major role in harmonising the technical specifications of goods and services 
traded on the global market. . State regulation in this domain must comply with “legitimate 
objectives”. With regard to goods, such concerns are related to health, safety and 
environmental issues. In contrast, competence, capacity to deliver and quality are the major 
issues in the sphere of services. The goal of removing “unnecessary” barriers to trade should 
furthermore be pursued insofar as possible by substituting international standards for 
domestic standards. GATS article VI:4 assigns to the Council for Trade and Services (through 
its Working Party on Domestic Regulation) the largely market-inspired task to develop ‘any 
necessary discipline’ to ensure that domestic regulations ‘do not constitute unnecessary 
barriers to trade [and are] not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the 
services’. The agreement furthermore specifies that “account shall be taken of international 
standards of relevant international organizations” determining whether a Member is in 
conformity with such discipline (GATS article VI:5b). Since the launch of services 
negotiations in 2000 independently from the so-called Doha development agenda, no decision 
has been reached within the WTO on further defining discipline in the global market for 
services. Despite the careful wording of the WTO2, a whole range of international bodies still 
have the capacity to define generic as well as detailed technical specifications affecting how 
swelling offshore services are expected to be traded on worldwide basis. The study of the 
European and American institutional settings for service standard is closely related to the 
significance of international standards in this context and to the ability of different models to 
promote their standards at an international level. 
Standardization in the United States is usually sketched as fragmented and organized on a 
sectoral basis. It is market-driven and evolves free from state intervention. It is characterized 
by a variety of competing standards organizations (formal and informal) and follows a so-
called model of direct participation, where companies have direct access to the standard-
                                                
2 In a footnote, the Agreement specifies that “the term “relevant international organizations” refers to 
international bodies whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members of the WTO”. 
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setting activities with international claim. By contrast, the European standardization system is 
coordinated, centralized and operates under a higher degree of government control. The 
European standardization bodies3, as well as ISO, follows a so-called model of national 
participation where a national body holds the voting rights within the international / regional 
standardization bodies such as ISO, IEC and CEN. In spite of their differencies, the European 
and American standardization system share common characteristics. They relie  on private 
organizations (Mattli and Büthe, 2003) and share what Czaya and Hessler call an “ethos” of 
standardization (Czaya and Hesser, 2001) or in Werle’s words they display a strong 
“instituional isomorphism”(Werle, 2001). Both of them frame the development and adoption 
process on a voluntary basis. They follow a due process open to all interested parties and their 
deliberations are based on the “state of the art”. The draft standards are subject to public 
consultation and the general interest is supposed to prevail over particular interests. Finally, 
the primacy of international standards is recognized by all standard-setting bodies, even 
though the understanding of what “international” means remains controversial. It should be 
added that the private nature of these organizations involves business models aimed at 
generating revenues to ensure their survival. 
Despite these similarities, several conflicts remain between European and American SDOs. 
From the American point of view, the national participation model in the European 
standardization bodies gives them a substantial advantage at the international level. The 
Vienna and Dresen agreements between the ISO and CEN, respectively between the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and CENELEC have provided prodedures 
for the adoption of European standards as international ones and have ensured a coordination 
of the standardization work between those organisations. Moreover, the European New 
Approach sets technical barriers to American firms by the distinct role it grants to the 
European standardization bodies. From a European point of view, the decentralized and the 
fragmented nature of standard setting procedures in the United States represents an obstacle to 
their access to US market. Moreover, the commercial intrerests prevailing in American SDOs 
often hinder their claim to serve the public interest. Finally, the international reach of informal 
standards developed in the United States tends to undermine the authority of formal 
standardization areans such as ISO and CEN. 
LITERATURE  
Standard is an object of enquiry closely related to globalisation studies highlighting new 
patterns and agents of change beyond state and market power. Scholarship on standards is 
dominated by business, economic, and applied science studies focused on industrial choices, 
market forces, and technological innovation (Blind, 2004; Cargill, 1989; Drèze, 1989; OECD, 
1999; Swann, 2000; Toth, 1984; Vries, 1999). From a political science oriented perspective, 
the  drive for technical specification and international standardisation is understood as a 
distinct institutional framework to ensure some order in market practices at the transnational 
level. Neo-institutional approaches have tried to explain the nature of the relations between 
private actors involved in standardisation and the institutional environment in which their 
actions take place. Borrowing the concept of transaction costs from institutional economics, 
these studies consider how the practices of agents can be defined by their environments to a 
considerable extent. From this perspective, standardisation provides an institutional guarantee 
for improving trust in transactions and curbing free riding risks among actors not willing to 
pay the full cost of expected benefits. Rational choice and game theories formalise systematic 
                                                
3 The three European standardization bodies are : the Comité Européen de Normalisation (CEN), the Comité 
Européen de Normalisation Electrotechnique (CENELEC) and the European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI). The ETSI differs significantly from CEN and CENELEC in that it accepts corporate as well as 
national members (Egan, 2001; Schoechle, 2009, p. 24). 
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explanations of cooperative games and conflicts of distribution in the institutional framework 
of standardisation (Abbott and Snidal, 2001; Mattli, 2001; Mattli and Büthe, 2003). In this 
view, the logic of action trumps its content and the understanding of the power relations 
involved in standardisation is confined to quantifiable and a priori defined criteria based on 
rationalist assumptions.  
Other studies adopt a more critical perspective on the socially and historically constructed 
framework of standardisation and its diversity across the globe. They provide accounts of the 
formation of the institutional architecture of standard-setting, beliefs underpinning standards, 
democratic controls of so-called independent regulatory authorities, conflicts of power in 
specific negotiations, or the broader scope of ISO-like standards (Brunsson, et al., 2000; 
Schmidt and Werle, 1998). Such analyses shed light, for instance, on the debate between the 
strongly institutionalised ISO and European systems, the more competitive pattern in the 
United States, and the oligopolistic nature of consortia agreements (Egan, 2001; Egyedi, 
2005; Nicolaïdis and Egan, 2001; Tate, 2001). Comparing the role of standards in the 
unification of the contemporary European market and the construction of the US market in the 
nineteenth century, Egan highlights the complementarities between regulation and free trade 
and the role of standardization in achieving this goal: “While European and American 
Businesses have both used the courts to circumvent trade restrictions, they have themselves 
been used by the federal government, which has frequently delegated regulatory 
responsibilities to industry expert involved in private standards bodies, industry and trade 
association and professional societies” (Egan, 2001, p. 37). Beyond the institutional 
differences between the U.S. and Europe, standardization is used in both cases as a tool for 
the construction of the internal market. 
Neo-institutional approaches have also been widely used to put the so-called variety of 
capitalism into perspective. Form this standpoint, Amercican and European standardization 
system differ according to the distinction between liberal market economy and coordinated 
market economy. The tension surrounding international standaridzation reflects the 
persistence of national differences related to the content of standards, to the institutional 
arrangements in charge of standardization, and to different perceptions of standardization by 
business. Thus, “Corporate strategies in liberal market economies treat standards as a 
proprietary good or service to be traded like any other. (…) Corporate strategies in 
coordinated market economies, by contrast, treat standards as an infrastructure for deeper 
cooperation” (Tate, 2001, p. 472). The either competitive or coordinating objective assigned 
to  standards in turn affects their source of legitimacy. As Winn point out, “in the U.S., the 
legitimacy of the activities of SDOs, formal or infomal, is generally perceived to be a function 
of resulting standards’ responsiveness to market conditions. Outside the U.S., the nature of 
the formal legal mandate to an SDO is generally perceived as pivotal in assessing the 
legitimacy of its work” (Winn, 2009, p. 21). While Winn relates these two sources of 
legitimacy to the divide between consortia and de jure ICT standards, the opposition also 
pertains to the distinction between the European national participation model and the 
American direct participation model. 
We can infer a more fine tuned analysis of the transatlantic divide from Egyedi’s social 
constructivist approach on the articulation between consortia versus formal standards (Egyedi, 
2005). She stresses that the dominant rhetoric underestimates the opening of most industry 
consortia and overestimates the practical implications of democratic procedures within formal 
organizations. This rather provocative statement emphasizes that the empirical reality often 
remains far from the usual depiction of both forms of standardization. Her analysis shows that 
the functioning of the committees is in both cases consensus-oriented and that the same 
stakeholders are excluded in practice. She also calls into question the supposedly sooner 
availability of standards developed within consortia and greater efficiency of their procedure. 
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In this context, consortia standards are problematic not because they represent an opposite 
practice, but in view of the use that governments make of standardization. The deliberate 
governmental use of standardization as an instrument of regulation involves the choice of 
institutions that reflect the democratic context from which emanates the regulation. Thus, 
asides from cases where standards are explicitly used as an instrument of regulation, 
democratic development procedures should not be a criterion for the acceptance of a standard. 
By contrast, where democratic legitimacy of standards is required, the democratic procedures 
must be mirrored in the composition of the technical committee. 
In brief, neo-institutionalist and comparative approaches provide fruitful accounts of some of 
the fundamental differences opposing the American and European models. Comparative 
approaches rightly stress how different trajectories and national institutions affect standards 
practices and the important role of states in this regard. However, they tend to confine the 
practices of SDOs within the sovereign territory and accordingly to reify their characteristics 
of SDOs. Moreover, they underestimate the involvement of U.S. governmental agencies in the 
American system and overestimate the practical implications of the more democratic 
procedures of formal SDOs. In this regard, we agree with Egyedi’s criticism. However, the 
openness of decision-making is not only important for standards related to public regulation. 
First, the governmental use of standards can be more or less explicit, but links always appear 
at some point (Dudouet, et al., 2006). Public authorities are involved in the construction of the 
authority of standards. They can refer to standards in regulations or in public procurement 
policies. They can participate to the technical work of the committees or have a seat at the 
board of directors. Thus, it is difficult to make any a priori assumption about the role of a 
standard in the regulation. Second, standards that surround our daily lives have an influence 
on our health and safety, no matter of their place in the regulation. It is therefore important to 
sustain the inclusiveness of the standards development process. 
More generally, as some political scientists and legal scholars have pointed out, the analysis 
of standardization requires to move beyond the dichotomies underpinning such conceptual 
framework: “Standards hover between state and the market; standards largely collapse the 
distinction between legal and social norms ; standards are very rarely either wholly public or 
wholly private, and can be both intensely local and irreducibly global. (…) standards can be 
seen as links between these spheres and institutions.” (Schepel, 2005, p. 4). The distinct 
practices of standardization calls to mind the nébuleuse that Cox portrayed in the mixture of 
official and unofficial transnational and international networks, with representatives of 
business, the state and academia working towards the formulation of a consensual policy for 
global capitalism (Cox, 1992). Such structural power of standardisation epitomises one 
among other new forms of non-state authority that have evolved over the past decade in the 
global political economy. The scope of international standards not only pertains to their 
potential worldwide reach, but also to the whole range of conflicts emanating from the 
capitalist system (Murphy, 1994; Murphy and Yates, 2009). Assessments of the relationship 
between standard-setting agencies and society as a whole are therefore bound to be 
controversial. The rise of international standardisation as a privileged form of devising 
technical specification thus typically encroaches upon two core issues which crystallise social 
struggles in capitalism: the opposition between labour and capital on the one hand, and the 
separation of the economy from the state as a necessary precondition for the reproduction of 
capitalism on the other hand. Standards intervene into the struggle between capital and labour. 
Workers may look to standards to ensure a safer workplace (e.g. standards on machine safety 
or maximum noise pollution) or obtain quality guarantees on the wage goods they purchase. 
In contrast, entrepreneurs, merchants, and financiers will equate standards with risk reduction, 
technological progress, strategic competitive behaviour, and profit. Regarding the separation 
between the economy and the state, the voluntary market-oriented dimension of standards 
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may reinforce free market claims to keep economic constraints and appropriation separated 
from politico-legal coercion. In the same time, however, the authority conferred to standard-
setters by state agencies may narrow down the conventional Weberian view of state 
autonomy. This prompts us to elaborate further on how the rise of standards reflects the rise 
of non-state authority in the global political economy. 
THE TRANSNATIONAL HYBRID AUTHORITY OF STANDARDS 
Non-state actors lead to new forms of power and authority in international relations. The 
literature on the rise of non-state actors, private authority and less conventional forms of 
sovereignty and governance has mushroomed over the last decade. A shared assumption of 
this scholarship, whatever its theoretical positions, is that at least two conditions must be met 
for such new forms of authority to be effective: the consent of actors subject to the rules 
without having been involved in their making; an explicit or implicit recognition by the state 
(Cutler, et al., 1999; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Grande and Pauly, 2005; Graz and 
Nölke, 2008; Hall and Bierstecker, 2002; Higgott, et al., 1999; Krause Hansen, 2008; Schirm, 
2004). A critical source of non-state authority in the global political economy is therefore 
what Sassen (2003; 2006) calls “denationalisation”, i.e. the process which contributes to the 
endogeneisation of private and transnational agendas within the political public sphere. 
Governments and intergovernmental institutions often support and fully recognise the power 
of non-state actors, who in turn may gain legitimate authority. The territorial basis of politics, 
of the state, and of the structural power of governments and markets still exists beyond 
various forms of transnational private governance highlighting serious obstacles on issues of 
substance and procedures. Standards are likely to generate insights into the analytical 
foundations of such new forms of transnational authority. We turn now to the core dimensions 
along which analysing in more detail the authority of international standards.  
The nature and the implications of the rise of non-state actors as standard-setting authority 
shaping the global political economy calls for aggregating three distinct categories: the 
objects – i.e. what is standardised; the actors – i.e. who has the authority to set standards; the 
space – i.e. where and from where standards are implemented. These three categories at best 
only capture some aspects of a complex and multifaceted process evolving extremely rapidly. 
Nonetheless, they try to point towards the significance of new forms of power in our societies. 
They draw upon previous attempts to conceptualise the rise of global hybrids as “a form of 
authority that blurs the subjects legitimately involved in it, pertains to objects undermining the 
distinction between science and society, and pursues a fragmentation of the space where the 
endogenous logic of territorial sovereignty gives way to an exogenous logic reinforcing the 
transnational underpinning of capitalism” (Graz 2006). Accordingly, the authority of 
standards entails numerous agents who play or claim to play a role not only as new actors, but 
also on the nature of objects and the spatial structure on which exerting their power. These 
three dimensions should be considered in more detail.  
The first dimension along which framing international standardisation concerns the actors 
involved in defining standards and the distinction between the private and public spheres in 
which they operate. Market mechanisms and policy choices both affect the agents involved in 
the field, but they do so in various ways, which may be seen as located on an institutional 
continuum defining who can standardise. Technical specifications belong to the private sphere 
of economic activities governed by market constraints, and affect social and technological 
change from that angle. They nonetheless remain related to the public sphere of political 
action directed to the general interest of society—for instance by determining a certain level 
of risk or by setting principles of liability. Hence, even in the circumscribed field of technical 
specification, norms relate as much to capital accumulation and technical progress as to social 
improvement or various instruments of the welfare state. When mandatory, enforceable and 
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general, technical specifications are thus a matter of public law and enjoy the status of 
government regulation. While some environment, health and safety performances are defined 
under such procedures, they are often established on a voluntary basis and are more particular 
in scope. In such cases, technical specifications involve standards-setting bodies, whose 
private or public statutes vary considerably according to countries. 
The second dimension shaping international standardisation relates to the objects covered by 
technical specifications. Whereas the private/public nexus of the actors involved in defining 
standards can be located on an institutional continuum, this second dimension maps out a 
material continuum delineating what can be standardised. This dimension aggregates the 
relation between human beings and nature, for so-called technical specifications range from 
natural and invariable physical measures to constructed and historically bound societal values. 
This dimension also highlights the extension of the scope of international standardization. If 
standards were initially confined to “physical” standards like screw thread, they are now 
covering more “societal” topics. Corporate social responsibility standards, quality and 
environmental management system standards are emblematic in this regard. Applied to the 
standardization of services, this aspect raises questions about what is a  service standard. In 
other words, do service standard concern the material support enabling its furniture 
(protective equipment used in leisure sector, IT interface of call center, etc.) or do they 
concern common intangible aspects of services (like billing, complain redress, information 
provision)? 
The third dimension on which situating international standardisation is the extent of the space 
on which technical specifications can be defined, diffused and recognised among sovereign 
states. In very general terms this dimension sheds light on the specific selectivity of diffusion 
and recognition processes. It refers to the spatial competence for conformity assessment 
procedures as well as for the recognition of standards. Standardisation occupies the cracks 
between the principle of exclusiveness of territorial sovereignty and the inclusiveness of rules 
governing the global economy. In order to understand this issue, we need to distinguish 
between exogenous and endogenous principles of standards recognition. The endogenous 
principle is related to a process of standard diffusion that is linked with the principle of 
territorial sovereignty (i.e. what makes an international standard is that its development 
process is based on territorial sovereignty principle). Conversely, the exogenous principle is 
related to the diffusion of standards through market mechanisms (i.e. what makes an 
international standard is its use by market actors across the globe). 
To sum up, a prominent feature of globalisation is the growing significance of services in the 
rise of a worldwide knowledge-based economy. This shift involves new patterns and agents of 
change through formal and informal regulatory practices of a wide range of non-state actors. 
Among them, service standards are likely to play a crucial role as they reflect a form of 
transnational hybrid authority whose scope spreads all along from physical measures to 
societal values, blurs the distinction between private and public actors, and reinforces the 
deterritorialisation of regulatory practices in contemporary capitalism. It is against this 
analytical framework that the remaining of the paper will provide an overview on 
developments in the field of service standardisation in the activities of formal standards 
development organisations (SDOs) within the European Union and the United States4.  
THE EUROPEAN SETTING 
More developments clearly take place at the regional level, especially in Europe as the 
European Union is in the forefront of both service integration and international 
                                                
4 There are other regional standardisation bodies, most notably in the Americas (Pan American Standards 
Commission, COPANT) and in Asia-Pacific (Pacific Area Standards Congress, PASC). As compared to the 
European system, however, their influence is still weak. 
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standardisation. In 1985, Council Resolution 85/C 136/01 on a ‘New Approach’ to technical 
harmonisation and standardisation has instigated a completely new regulatory technique and 
strategy5. The resolution was a response to the growing role of the European Court of Justice 
in solving conflicting regulatory policies in the internal European market. It was also an early 
move towards the completion of the Single Market by devising procedures to avoid turning 
technical specifications into a structural impediment to trade. Although member states were 
wary about seeing regulation in this domain transferred to the European authorities, they did 
perceive the threat of a race to the bottom in public purpose standards as integration 
progressed. The New Approach provides a framework for the harmonisation of EU public law 
only on the general and essential requirements of goods and services traded on the European 
market, in particular in the field of health, environment, safety, and consumer protection. 
Depending on the sectors affected, technical specifications, performance criteria and quality 
requirements are either based on mutual recognition of national standards, or delegated to 
European standard-setting bodies. In most sectors, the procedure for monitoring standards is a 
matter of business self-regulation, since products put on the market are granted a presumption 
of conformity through the sole declaration of the manufacturer (CE marking). Thus, the 
European New Approach has not only strengthened the importance of voluntary standards in 
the Single Market. By avoiding costly third party testing and certification, and providing the 
procedural means for a simultaneous adoption of European standards as international ones 
(through the so-called Dresden and Vienna Agreements), the EU has also won over third 
countries to its standardisation system. The (largely unintended) outcome has been a powerful 
strategic positioning of European standards in the global market (Egan, 2001; Vogel, 1995).  
The European Commission was well aware that the emergence of an increasingly dense and 
extensive European standardisation complex with global reach should also be able to support 
the Lisbon Agenda agreed at the European Council meeting of March 2000. Services were a 
core feature of the Lisbon Agenda “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world”. New emphasis on service standards occurred after the 2005 mid-
term review of the Lisbon Agenda and developments leading to the adoption of the Directive 
2006/123/EC on services in the Internal Market, the so-called Bolkestein Directive eventually 
agreed on second reading in December 2006 and fully implemented since the end of 2009. A 
horizontal approach to the harmonisation of different regulations on the European level lays at 
the centre of this directive aiming at minimizing limits to the free movement of services and 
service providers by discrimination based on nationality or local residence. The controversial 
“country of origin” principle has now been substituted for the formula “freedom to provide 
services”. The service must conform to regulations of his/her “place of establishment”. But in 
order to further unify the internal market for services, the Directive sees the promotion of 
quality as a key objective. To this end, it explicitly encourages the work of professional 
independent or community bodies of standard-development and certification (like CEN, 
CENELEC, or ETSI) in order to develop voluntary quality marks and labels (preamble 102 
and article 26).  
It is against such background that DG Enterprise and Industry of the European Commission 
addressed in October 2003 a first Programming mandate (M 340) to CEN, CENELEC and 
ETSI in the field of services in order to identify priority sectors where intra-community trade 
in services is already occurring or likely to surge. Issues could include horizontal cross-
sectoral generic standards and vertical sector-specific standards, as well as service providers 
or end-users. After several events organised in 2004 in response to this mandate, a second 
programming mandate (M 371) was addressed to CEN in the field of services in 2005 
following the transfer of responsibility for business related services to DG Internal Market 
                                                
5 For a discussion of the increasing reliance on standardisation in European law making and public policy from a 
deliberative suprationalist perspctive, see: (Joerges, et al., 1999). 
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and Services. In 2007, eleven projects have been developed across half a dozen of European 
standardisation bodies in response to this second mandate.  
The CEN Horizontal European Service Standardization Strategy (CHESSS) is the largest of 
the eleven projects formed in response to EU Mandate M/371. This initiative is organised as a 
consortium of national standards bodies led by the British Standards Institute (BSI), in 
association with those from Spain (AENOR), Germany (DIN), Denmark (DS), Estonia (EVS) 
and the Netherlands (NEN), as well as participation from CapGemini, one of the world leader 
in IT services consulting and management. The initiative has examined the feasibility of 
taking a generic approach to European service standardization, in focussing on the extent to 
which standardization could apply across multiple service sectors and the benefits of doing so 
as opposed to following a sector-specific approach. By taking a generic approach, CHESSS 
seeks to establish the underlying principles for an ongoing programme of European service 
standardization capable of facilitating the delivery of services across the European Union, 
unimpeded by national borders6. In its final report published in 2009, CHESSS formulates 
five recommendations (CHESSS Consortium, 2009). It supports the establishment of a 
guidance document for drafting future standards, the creation of a standardised Pan-European 
Customer Satisfaction Index (CSI), the clarification of services glossary and equivalence 
issues, and the elaboration of a guidance document for customer centricity and interface. Last 
but not least, it recommended the development of a single generic European service standard 
including the design of the service, information provision to customer, billing, complain and 
redress, as well as innovation and review.  
In addressing the standardization of services from a generic point of view, the CHESSS 
project has raised questions about the specific identity of service standards. The importance of 
quality in services has inevitably led to question their specificity with regard to quality 
management standards (i.e. ISO 9000 series). One module of the project specifically claims 
that service standards are not about the “how” but about the “what”, i.e. a service standard is 
not on how to achieve a goal as for management standards, but specifiy the goal to be 
achieved and the means for assessing its achievment. In this regard, the definition of a 
customer satisfaction index will undoubtedly be as crucial in framing conformity assessment 
procedures in services as weights and measures underpinn similar procedures for products. 
It’s worth noting that the specific identity of service standards is not limited to their content 
but also extends to the definition of writing models as well as specific terminology. In this 
regard, the CHESSS project provides essential tools in order to ensure that service standards 
gain their specificity in the realm of standardization, as management or performance 
standards. 
Unsurprisingly, the CHESSS report points out to the likely difficulty of involving a wide 
range of stakeholders when a lot of them lack the awareness and resources to do so. This 
clearly bodes no good to the expected deliberative quality in the production of such a 
standard. It’s worth noting, however, that throughout the modules, significant differences 
exists regarding the approach to horizontal standards: some are in favour of multiple 
horizontal standards as opposed to a single horizontal standard; some prefer horizontal 
standards completed by vertical standards, while others remain very sceptical about the 
capacity of horizontal standards to deal with the diversity of the service economy. A distinct 
module of the report focused on B2B services even suggests a so-called ABC-standard system 
as a suitable response to the antagonism opposing horizontal generic standards to vertical 
sectoral standards (the idea would be to establish an institutional hierarchy between different 
types of standards, A-standards being for all services, B-standards or semi-horizontal 
standards for a group of services and C-standards being sector specific). The difficulty of 
                                                
6 Quincy Lissaur, Senior Business Consultant, BSI-British Standards, interview with the author, London, 23 
January 2007.  
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stakeholders involvment as well as antagonisms related to the strategy of standardization have 
led to question the existing structures for the development of service standards. Some 
modules emphasize that the current system is as appropriate for services as for products. In 
contrast, the module for B2B services suggests a new system based on a dual representation 
that would allow to better include a range of stakeholders besides national bodies, such as 
European organizations representing industry, SMEs and consumers: “This double 
representation system ensures a balanced representation of sectors on the one hand and of 
national interest on the other hand” (CHESSS Consortium, 2009, p. 223). By and large, it 
remains unclear whether the CHESSS strategy will be successful; yet the interest in a single 
horizontal generic standard with a certification scheme is clearly an attempt to promote 
services standards at a par to the worldwide achievement of the ISO 9000 series.  
In contrast, the other ten projects responding to the EU Mandate M/371 address the specificity 
of distinct markets of services. As a pioneer in national standards developed and supported by 
private and public service providers in well-defined service sectors, Afnor, the French 
national standardisation body, initiated those projects in consultation with a few European 
standardisation bodies, in particular those from the Netherlands and Denmark. The 
recommendations made in the final report on the feasibility of European service standards 
thus identify a number of service activities likely to be standardised at various levels of 
institutionalisation, be it European Standards per se, or guidance materials and workshop 
agreements7. The quality of the deliberation process is an important rationale in defending the 
superiority of a vertical and sectoral approach. According to Pascal Gautier, in charge of the 
Management and services unit at Afnor, generic standards in services would soon become 
burdensome and unrealistic as “ they require phenomenal efforts which would eventually 
generate opposition”; in his view, “it is much better to privilege a niche approach in service 
standards so as to keep a sector-specific proximity, to privilege a so-called Swiss army knife 
effect where each blade has its distinct use”.8 Yet, the ambiguous mixture of private and 
public actors involved in standardisation processes privileged by this approach remains 
important and the issues concerned continue to be ambivalent with regard to their societal or 
more strictly technical objects of reference.. In this regard, a narrower sectoral approach is 
certainly not a sufficient condition for securing standards which would become alternate 
instruments of auto-protection of society. A proper differentiation of actors among 
stakeholders and issues spanning physical measure to societal values, as well as clear-cut 
incentives to mitigate representation biases would be necessary to ensure a fair, substantial 
and thorough representation in standardisation processes. 
THE AMERICAN SETTING 
In contrast to the European standardisation processes viewed as driven by a coherent and 
centralised institutional framework, the American standardisation setting is routinely depicted 
as fragmented and decentralised. In Mattli’s words, “the disagreement between Europeans 
and Americans is about whether an international standard is simply one that benefits from de 
facto or de jure international acceptance and use by an industry, or whether it must come from 
an organization that is truly international in the sense that it has an international representation 
of national members and an international voting structure based on those national members. A 
resolution of this disagreement is not in sight; it will require, among other things, a clearer 
                                                
7 CEN/CEN Management Centre, Summary, Background and Proposals related to European Commission 
Programming Mandate M/371 in the Field of Services [n.d. April 2009]. According the Report, standardisation 
work should be initiated in the following areas: accessibility of transport and tourist services, project 
management services in the field of engigeering concultancy, services for residential homes and older persons, 
reception services, IT- and non-IT service outsourcing, and smart house services. 
8 Pascal Gautier, Head of unit ‘Management and services’, Afnor, interview with the author, Paris, 18 April 
2007. 
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understanding of the relationship between national, regional and international standardization 
organizations” (Mattli, 2001, p. 330). The contrast drawn by Mattli between the American 
and European systems is based on a partially false dichotomy. The conventional transatlantic 
divide in fact bears similarities on a number of issues.  
First, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), while a strictly non-for-profit private 
organisation, nonetheless plays a significant role in centralising standardisation processes. Its 
mandate explicitly makes ANSI in charge of the coordination and representation of US 
interests at the ISO and IEC. ANSI also plays a crucial role in enhancing the coherence of 
standard-setting processes both within the US and among US participants in international 
arenas. Although not developing standards itself, it coordinates and accredits US-based SDOs, 
which in turn must comply with the ANSI essential requirements for standards development 
processes (ANSI, 2008). As a matter of fact, key actors of the US standardization system 
themselves question its depiction as fragmented and decentralised. According to the Vice 
President of International Policy of ANSI, American standardisation processes rather take 
place in an “organised distributed system”9. While ANSI is responsible for the coordination of 
over 200 accredited SDOs, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is the 
federal agency that fulfils a similar role at the level of governmental agencies. Over the last 
decade, the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1996 which requires 
federal agencies to adopt private standards and the Circular A-119 of the Office of 
Management and Budget have played a significant role to enhance NIST’s profile; those 
pieces of legislation and regulation grant to NIST the mission to promote the use of voluntary 
standards in lieu of government unique standards within federal agencies. NIST annual 
reports highlight the important participation of federal agencies within formal and informal 
SDOs. According the eleventh annual report on the use of voluntary standards in the United 
States, over 3’300 employees among 26 federal agencies have contributed to the development 
of voluntary standards in nearly 500 formal and informal SDOs (Donaldson, 2008). Another 
report on the impact of the participation of NIST employees upon standards development 
processes indicates that over 400 of them took part to just about 1’400 technical committees 
of formal and informal SDOs (Puskar, 2009). According to the same report, NIST 
participation contributes to broaden the scope of standards, accelerate their development, and 
improve the products and services related to them. The direct involvement of governmental 
agencies is only part of the relationship between public authorities and standardization. More 
than 8’600 standards are referred to in U.S. law, and over 10’500 in public procurement 
procedures. It is also worth noting that ANSI Steering Committee not only includes 
representatives of industry and civil society, but also a number of government agencies.10 
Similarly, ASTM Board of Directors includes representatives from governmental agencies. 
While the American institutional setting is not as dissimilar as conventionally understood 
from the European and ISO framework, current developments in the distinct domain of 
service standards remain in sharp contrast on both sides of the Atlantic. Services are for the 
most part nonexistent in the agenda of American SDOs. Even the largest standard-setters 
seem to overlook the challenge that addressing the service sector may represent for the future 
standardisation. In 2009, the strategic plans of the Board of Directors of the American Society 
of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) focused on nuclear and renewable energies, the 
                                                
9 Gary Kushnier, Vice-President ot unit ‘International Policy’, Ansi, interview with the author, Washington, 7 
August 2009. 
10 Among others, governmental agencies represented are: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), Department of Defense (DoD); among others industry members are: Motorola, 
IBM, Rockwell Automation, and Boeing; among others  represented SDOs are: Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers, ASTM International, ASME, Underwriters Laboratories; among others civil society 
representatives are the National Consumer League and Consumers Union. 
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development of the engineering workforce and globalization11. As Berhard E. Hrubala, Vice-
President of AMSE and Division Manager at TÜV Rheinland puts it, “our ultimate goal at the 
end of the day is, don’t’ matter what the standard is in every country, we want their standards 
to be consistent with the ASME standards”12. As it turns out, supporting greater international 
recognition of ASME standards supposes translating standards, including non-US members in 
the technical committees, locating a few meetings outside of the United States and carrying 
out training and workshops tailored to the specific needs of third countries. But none of these 
activities specifically focus on services. While ASTM International (originally known as the 
American Society for Testing and Materials) shares this claim to play a leadership role at the 
global level with an active policy of memoranda of understanding signed with over sixty 
national SDOs, it ignores the issue of service standards and prefers giving prime importance 
to sustainability. It is for this standpoint that ASTM International plans to revise most existing 
standards and chart new activities related to carbon footprint and alternative fuels. Katharine 
E. Morgan, ASTM Vice-President of the Technical Committee Operations, goes to great 
length to explain this strategic shift: “We are seeing green, from roofing to isolation to 
degradable plastics, we are seeing that across a lot of our committees ”13. For its part, Belinda 
Collins, Director of Technology Services at NIST, emphasises its role in streamlining 
strategic issues set by the Obama administration in domains such as smart grid standards, 
healthcare IT standards and security standards (including “preparedness” and “business 
continuity”) initiated by the Department of Homeland Security14. Finally, ANSI considers that 
abiding by its coordination mandate is at odds with setting any priority at all as long as its 
members have not done so –that is so far indeed the case and de facto excludes service 
standards among potential hot topics15 . 
Officials in charge of addressing standardisation needs in the various bodies of the American 
institutional setting invariably explain the lack of concerns over service standards by a lack of 
demand. All our interviewees confirmed this. James McCabe, the Director of ANSI 
Consumer Relations, was even surprised to see services on the ANEC16 agenda: “I remember 
the first time when I saw one of the ANEC reports about standardization of services, I was 
really just surprised. The idea that you would get those industries interested enough to 
participate in standards writing activities, which take a lot of time and resources, it surprised 
me that there would be this feeling that could be something that would be accepted by the 
market – especially since it’s not driven by the market”17. It is only in response to specific 
questions that ASTM officials laboriously refer to some activities in the field of services, such 
as emergency medical services, translation, and site assessment; they do not take part, 
however, to ISO activities as no demand has ever been formulated to do so by its 
membership. Interestingly, the few service standards dealt with among US SDOs are 
essentially confined to domestic issues. For instance, the development of a standard for site 
assessments merely responds to a requirement set by the US Environmental Protection 
                                                
11 William Berger, Managing Director, Asme, and Bernard E. Hrubala, Sr. Vice President, ASME,and Division 
Manager of unit ‘Industrial Services’, TÜV Rheinland, interview with the author, New-York, 18 August 2009. 
12 Bernard E. Hrubala, Sr. Vice President, ASME,and Division Manager of unit ‘Industrial Services’, TÜV 
Rheinland, interview with the author, New-York, 18 August 2009. 
13 Katharine E. Morgan, Vice President of unit ‘Technical Committee Operations’, Astm International, interview 
with the author, West Conshohocken, 19 August 2009. 
14 Belinda Lowenhaupt Collins, Director of unit ‘Technology Services’, Nist, interview with the author, 
Gaithersburg, 3 August 2009. 
15 Gary Kushnier, Vice-President ot unit ‘International Policy’, Ansi, interview with the author, Washington, 7 
August 2009. 
16 ANEC is the European consumer voice in standardization. 
17 James McCbe, Director of unit ‘Consumer Relations and IDSP’, Ansi, interview with the author, New-York, 
17 August 2009. 
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Agency18. For its part, ASME has no activities related to services and when we mentioned the 
issue of maintenance or inspection services, our interlocutor indicated that their standards 
include those issues, contrary to ISO standards: “Many of our standards do cover the whole 
game… use, maintenance, inspection, testing ... I don’t think we have the single standard for 
just maintenance versus manufacturing, as opposed to, I think, ISO is more like that, they 
have many standards that cover one field”19. Overall, standardization in services does not lie 
at the heart of our interviewees’ preoccupations: “ASTM don’t take a position with evaluating 
those… we would let those industries just go and do their participation in ISO on that”20. In 
ASME words, the statement is: “Our scope is essentially mechanical engineering, those 
services type things don’t really fall within our area”21. ANSI claims more support, but also 
calls to mind the warning given to ISO against premature venture into all sort of service areas, 
most notably because of the lack of industry support22. 
Accordingly, the distinct issue of supporting either horizontal cross-sectoral generic standards 
or vertical sector-specific standards is assumed to be merely of pragmatic concerns. In 
ANSI’s words: “We don’t prefer one over the other, it’s what is needed”23. Yet, this issue is 
often referred to the ISO standard for corporate social responsibility and more broadly to 
certification policies. In this regards, ANSI and NIST remain highly critical standards likely 
to be used for certification purpose. Taking the example of ISO 9000, ANSI emphasises the 
lack of added value brought by certification: “It didn’t add value if you are a large company 
and you already have an excellent quality management system, what does it bring to spend a 
few more millions of dollars or euros to get certified to something you do better already?”24. 
For ASME, ISO is better equipped to deal with horizontal generic standards than vertical and 
closely defined industry-specific standards: “ISO is more politically driven than technically 
driven. A lot of the countries that participate in ISO … their standards body is either 
government or quasi like government body ... they don’t’ have the technical experts at least at 
the top level that has voted … I am not sure the balance – the technical versus the political 
within ISO – runs itself to the best technical standards”25. ASTM echoes this position: 
“We’ve never been asked to do that [thinking through generic service standards], and maybe 
because ISO has become ... it’s gonna be the place for the development of these broad system 
standards…”26. 
DISCUSSION 
What kind of transnational authority can be hypothesised with regard to the ongoing 
processes taking place in the domain of service standardisation in the European and American 
contexts? How do those distinct institutional settings affect future developments of service 
standards? We now turn more specifically on how the developments presented above matter 
                                                
18 Katharine E. Morgan, Vice President of unit ‘Technical Committee Operations’, Astm International, interview 
with the author, West Conshohocken, 19 August 2009. 
19 William Berger, Managing Director, Asme, and Bernard E. Hrubala, Sr. Vice President, ASME,and Division 
Manager of unit ‘Industrial Services’, TÜV Rheinland, interview with the author, New-York, 18 August 2009. 
20 Katharine E. Morgan, Vice President of unit ‘Technical Committee Operations’, Astm International, interview 
with the author, West Conshohocken, 19 August 2009. 
21 William Berger, Managing Director, Asme, and Bernard E. Hrubala, Sr. Vice President, ASME,and Division 
Manager of unit ‘Industrial Services’, TÜV Rheinland, interview with the author, New-York, 18 August 2009 
22 Gary Kushnier, Vice-President ot unit ‘International Policy’, Ansi, interview with the author, Washington, 7 
August 2009. 
23 Idem. 
24 Idem. 
25 William Berger, Managing Director, Asme, and Bernard E. Hrubala, Sr. Vice President, ASME,and Division 
Manager of unit ‘Industrial Services’, TÜV Rheinland, interview with the author, New-York, 18 August 2009. 
26 Katharine E. Morgan, Vice President of unit ‘Technical Committee Operations’, Astm International, interview 
with the author, West Conshohocken, 19 August 2009. 
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in assessing the potential authority of international standards in the service sector along the 
three core dimensions of the issues concerned, the agents involved, and the space on which 
such standardisation processes are likely to be recognised. 
Regarding the objects concerned by the current debate on the development of service 
standards, it appears that the potential scope of international standardisation in the domain of 
services considerably differs on both sides of the Atlantic. This emphasizes the significant 
role that standards play in creating new markets and, if so, with different emphasis on either 
narrow market requirements or broader societal concerns. In both cases, however, a strong 
public support represents a driving force behind SDOs’ agendas. The standardization of 
services in Europe has its roots in mandates of the Commission and underlines a strong 
(inter)governmental concern on the instrumental role of standards in achieving a single 
market for services. In contrast, a single market for services already exists for most domains 
in the United States. As a result, the demand for creating new service standards is low. It is 
worth noting that the very few activities related to service standards in the United States 
specifically target the domestic market. Thus, despite the different position of services on the 
European and American standardization agendas, service standards are in both cases related 
to the construction and maintenance of their respective internal market. While this provides 
support to Egan’s claim on the role of standards in the construction of American and 
European markets, it also sheds light on the ongoing difficulties to boost the development of 
international service standards with a truly global relevance.  
What can be standardised in the domain of services seems to target a much larger set of issues 
in Europe than in the United States. While the intangible and relational nature of a number of 
services is often viewed as a major hindrance to standardisation, the development of technical 
interfaces to industrialise the provision of services and the promotion of stereotyped 
behaviours denying the specificity of the service relationship depend on standards too. 
Decision trees in offshore contact centres and quality and security requirements in data 
transfer and processing services would be such examples. Yet, a more progressive response in 
setting standardised behaviours in service deliveries across borders would include broader 
societal concerns and suppose a greater involvement of service providers and beneficiaries 
alike in responding to increasing doubts on the misuse of services.  
The antagonism between vertical and horizontal standards precisely reflects the struggles at 
stake in defining what should be standardized in services: should it be the outer layer of some 
generic attributes suitable on a horizontal basis for the widest range of services (information 
requirements, billing, complaint handling, etc.), technical interfaces supporting the interaction 
between service providers and customers, or, much more comprehensively on a so-called 
vertical basis, the precise way that services are produced and used in distinct activities? 
Probably all of them, but some responses allow for greater societal concerns than others and 
the more intangible the service tends to be, the more difficult to measure. This is where the 
question of evaluation becomes all the more important. In spite of all its flaws, the European 
CHESSS project still provides in this regard a significant step in building a coherent 
framework for the standardization of services, as its recommendation for the development of a 
pan-European customer satisfaction index may clearly become instrumental in providing a 
standard of evaluation likely to overcome the controversy between vertical and horizontal 
service standards. Devised to gauge the quality of services, this index provides a basis for 
demonstrating the positive impact that the use of a standard may have on customer 
satisfaction, be it horizontal or vertical. Finally, it is worth noting that the case of energy and 
smart metering exemplifies well how the societal dimension of service standardization is 
likely to be more pronounced in Europe than in the United States, where the focus is on 
narrower technical and market-driven aspects. The interest in smart metering lies in a better 
use and control of energy resources. Our American interlocutors stressed the strategic 
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importance of this issue, which was also identified as such in a module of the European 
CHESSS project. Surprisingly, however, standardization activities in this domain was not 
identified as having any relation with the provision of services and public utilities by our US 
interviewees; for them, they relate to the physical characteristics of the resources delivered by 
such services. In contrast, the CHESSS project explicitly anchors the subject to the more 
generic matter of billing services and devising more sustainable practices in this domain.  
Regarding the agents involved in the standardization of services, this paper provides strong 
evidence of the significance of public support, in particular the European political institutions. 
However, the difficulties identified within the CHESSS project also shed light to a common 
feature on both sides of the Atlantic as well as within the ISO context: the support and 
expertise of private actors are crucial to the development of a standard. The low level of US 
involvement in the field of service standards mirrors the difficulty of European and ISO 
projects to bring on board stakeholders from the private sector. This highlights that behind the 
distinct labels of direct participation for the American setting and national participation for 
the European and ISO setting, agents of actual standardisation processes are the same: large 
firms dominate the technical committees, government agencies usually take part in drafting 
standards, and not-for-profit associations from the civil society remain largely under-
represented. In contrast to the direct political influence of the European setting, United States 
system relies on the indirect influence of the legal and regulatory environment that supports 
and legitimizes the work of formal and informal SDOs. Thus, beyond fragmentation we 
should underline the double coordination system existing in the United States. This work is 
ensured by the ANSI at the level of formal SDOs and by NIST with regard to governmental 
agencies. The distinction between national participation and direct participation is then 
perhaps more relevant to describe the strategies for building a space of standards recognition 
than to emphasise the level of political involvement. 
This brings us to the third dimension defining the authority standards: the extent of the space 
on which technical specifications in the domain services are likely to be defined, diffused and 
recognised among sovereign states. The rivalry regarding international standards refers to 
different sources of legitimacy, as well as various modes of cooperation. The adoption of 
standards by the market is the main source of legitimacy of standards developed by US-based 
SDOs. They primarily rely on the exogenous process of market mechanisms to ensure the 
recognition of their standards beyond the sovereign space of the United States. As one of our 
interlocutors emphasised, standards can this be considered as good entry points into new 
markets27. The translation of standards and training tailored to the distinct needs of well-
chosen countries are integral part of this strategy. This does not mean, however, that US 
SDOs overlook a legitimacy of their standards based on participation. The holding of 
meetings abroad and the inclusion of non-American members at the technical as well as 
boards of directors’ levels are part of this participatory strategy. The ASTM MoUs signed 
with a great number of national standards bodies are strongly echoing the principle of national 
representation in use at the CEN and ISO, even if they are part of a contractual and bilateral 
strategy. Conversely, in Europe, the legitimacy of standards follows participatory strategies 
that give a central place to the national representation principle. In this way, the diffusion and 
adoption of standards is ensured according to the principle of territorial sovereignty. 
However, standardization in the domain of services is likely to generate a hybrid model, in 
which the national participation model would be complemented by a model of direct 
participation, as suggested by the double representation system proposed by one module of 
the CHESS project. However, the implementation of the double representation systems relies 
more upon the requirement to involve stakeholders than the objective to broaden the spectrum 
                                                
27 William Berger, Managing Director, Asme, and Bernard E. Hrubala, Sr. Vice President, ASME,and Division 
Manager of unit ‘Industrial Services’, TÜV Rheinland, interview with the author, New-York, 18 August 2009. 
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of standard recognition by other means. As the CHESSS project falls short to define the most 
suitable structures for setting future service standards, the double representation system may 
just be a one-off procedure used in case of negotiations directed towards the definition of a 
single generic service standard – as it has been the case in the current ISO 26000 negotiation. 
Finally, the question of the certification of the future European horizontal service standard 
will become a contested issue between the US and Europe. The reluctance of our US 
interviewees to standards established for certification purpose and the insistence of the 
CHESSS project on the desirability of a certification scheme makes this quite clear. The US 
reluctance is justified on the basis of the lack of added value that certification brings to a 
company. In Europe, by contrast, certification is justified by its contribution to market 
transparency that would sustain and foster intra-European trade in services. The opposition 
between Europe and the United States can again be interpreted in terms of their market. If one 
considers the certification standard on a unified market, then the question of its contribution 
to shareholder value now becomes central. Conversely, if one considers the certification in a 
market under construction, namely that of services in Europe, then the question of its 
contribution to the achievement of this market becomes central. Is the main added value of 
certification the creation of a market? Whatever the answer, the use of certification in Europe 
can also be interpreted as an effort to ensure the recognition of the future European standard 
through market mechanisms. 
TOWARDS A NUANCED VIEW OF THE AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN SETTING 
In sharp contrast to conventional views opposing the European and American standardization 
systems, this paper has drawn upon the concept of transnational hybrid authority to offer a 
rather different picture of how those two institutional settings may affect future developments 
of service standards within the overall significance of services in the global economy. Our 
theoretical framework applies to products as well as services. However, it enables to 
underline important implications of the specificity of services (i.e. intangible and relational 
nature) on the three analytical dimensions of the actors setting standards, the issues 
concerned, and the space of their recognition. The perceived idiosyncrasy of services explains 
to a large extent the reluctance of service providers to engage in standard-setting activities. 
Where product manufacturers see standards as a way to achieve economies of scale or to 
impose technical solutions, service providers fear a loss of identity and fail to see potential 
benefits associated with standardization, thus favouring ‘exit’ over ‘voice’ strategies 
(Hirschman, 1970). CEN mandates then belongs to the few available alternatives able to 
sustain the development of service standards. The specificity of services also imply a distinct 
framing of what can be standardized and how. Whilst terminological issues are at the basis of 
all standards, the attention paid to equivalence issue (rather than translation) underlines the 
greater social embeddedness of service standards. Physical measure are not suitable for 
services, thus implying the development of evaluation tools which in turn and according to 
the tools’ content will impact upon the development of future service standards. The third 
dimension highlights that whilst CEN future services standards are primarily aimed at 
constructing a European market for services, they will represent an important driver and 
framework for the development of services standards at the international level – contrary to 
products standards, where the CEN follows a framework originally set by the ISO, the 
development of ISO service standards is likely to incorporate the framework currently under 
discussion within the CEN (a first mover advantage with regard to the service field). 
More specifically, our results shed light on the extent to which public and private actors 
overlap in the standardization arenas on both sides of the Atlantic. A closer attention to the 
object of standardization underlines the uncertainty and ongoing struggles surrounding the 
specific features of services standards, or in other word what can be standardized. A 
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significant issue in this regard is the opposition between advocates of so-called horizontal 
generic standards supposedly valid for any kind of service provision, and those in favour of 
so-called vertical standards on more narrowly defined issues for distinct industries or 
processes. Finally, future developments in service standards are likely to reinforce the 
deterritorialisation of regulatory practices. Our results provide evidence for a nuanced 
understanding of this catchword view on globalization. Whilst the wider spatial recognition of 
US based standards primarily relies on market mechanisms involving to some extent global 
market forces, the American setting also includes territorially-based legitimacy processes, 
such as the involvement of non-US SDOs in standard development processes. Similarly, 
opposing views on the range of recognition for future service standards developed within the 
European setting are likely to generate various compromises around hybrid models, where 
market- and territorially-based systems would heavily intermingle with each other. 
An first lesson to be drawn from our findings is clearly the more nuanced view of the 
conventional distinction between the European and American system and the importance to 
look more specifically at antagonisms within each standardization system. Another 
implication is that both systems tend to differ the most on the definition of what exactly a 
service standard is. American practionners tend to deny the very service identity of standards 
which in the European context would specifically be tagged within this distinct category. We 
have seen that smart metering could a particularly fruitful case for future research. A further 
implication is how the issue to be standardized affects, in turn, the institutional setting. This is 
particularly the case with the European CHESSS project that appears to be instrumental in 
setting a coherent framework for the standardization of services, although its mandate was 
originally confined on the more likely areas to be standardized. From this standpoint, it 
remains to be seen whether horizontal and vertical standards represent opposite or 
complementary options. The guide for the development of service standard, the customer 
satisfaction index, terminological definition, are all tools designed to promote the 
standardization of services, whether horizontal or vertical. The potential benefits of a 
horizontal standard will be more visible if recurring contents can be identified throughout 
vertical standards. The development of a unique horizontal standard will be paradoxically 
sustained by the development of vertical standards and thus could reflect of the maturity of 
service standardization. 
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